What is an interstate war? | Yahoo Answers

Interstate War | Political Violence @ a Glance

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Version 3.0 of the Correlates of War Inter-State War data set is matched to Version 3.10 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set. Each interstate war between 1816 -1997 has its corresponding dispute. This report is available for download .

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Oh, and an interstate war is when the government of one country is fighting the government of another country. The "War on Terror" is NOT an interstate war, because we are fighting terrorist who move from country to country.

interstate war vs. intrastate war? | Yahoo Answers

Academic scholarship on the conflict tends not to mark 1945 as its beginning. Most pieces of scholarship refer to 1948. Thorough studies trace the conflict back to the years 1917-1923, or the beginning of British rule in Palestine. A few others trace it back to the beginning of Zionist settlement in the country towards the end of the 19th century. For clear reasons, no one claims that the conflict came to an end in 1979, after the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty appeared to put an end to the era of Arab-Israeli interstate wars. This con-fusion stems to a large degree from the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not one, but rather two conflicts, both of which are complexly and inextricably linked in a number of ways. Zionist Jews in Palestine (or the pre-1948 Jewish autonomy in the country) and later the state of Israel have permanently been a party to the conflict. By contrast, the ‘Arabs’ - or the Palestinians and the Arab states surrounding Palestine - have been changing parties to the overall conflict and its many different wars.

SAGE Reference - Rivalry, Conflict, and Interstate War


Ultimately, the war among the people rising is really one of the "symptoms" of a temporary global decline of the concept of "State" and of the interstate warfare. An evolution of the political organizations and practices involves a change of the methods to make war. Nobody can really say what will be the face of war during the next decades even if for the next years, the hybrid threats may probably entail new types of operations which will combine counter insurgency, stabilization and interstate war knowledge. A large share of information and the understanding of the environment, the opponents and the populations should be the keys of the future warfare. The greatest armed forces in the world will thus have to train both for interstate and intrastate wars. What seems to be the most important is to adapt all aspects of these forces to intrastate warfare: command and control systems, organization, equipment, and mentalities. Those who dare not to adapt will run the risk of defeat. To paraphrase Charles Darwin, it is neither the strongest nor the most intelligent competitor that survives, but rather the most adaptive to change.I don't dispute the decline of interstate war post-1945. My point, however, is that "the rise of intrastate wars" took place in the 1960s-1980s, and not now.Excellent points, and I would add that the world is actually more stable than it has been in many years, but that stability seems to be threatened by a number of factors, factors that will alter the trend lines. Trend lines change over time (that's why they're trends). In my crystal ball I see an emerging trend where interstate warfare will be on the raise again based on a number of factors best discussed in a separate forum. We can't afford to reshape the military to fight solely in intrastate conflicts. That would be a fool's errand. Despite all of this, blood is still being shed in Israel/Palestine. The geographical unit defined by the British Mandate as Palestine still remains a permanent source of local and international instability. I argue that by discontinuing their war against Israel, the surrounding Arab states made room for the resumption of a different, new/old war, which, as I explain below, first erupted prior to the Arab-Israeli interstate war: the civil war between the Jewish-Zionist settler society and Palestinian Arabs, a war over Palestine.Concur with Rex, and would add that the author's claim that interstate wars are on the decline is also questionable, and a dangerous assumption to make for strategic decision makers. The author later notes that the State is facing a temporary decline, which implies that interstate wars may increase in the out years, and we can't very well stand up a conventional army from stratch anymore, because we no longer have the industrial base to do so. None the less, I still found the article useful.A third perspective on the global trend in armed conflict focuses on the annual numbers of onsets of new wars in the global system to examine their frequency and regularity and whether there have been marked changes in those factors over time. Figure 5 charts three additional metrics: 1) number of interstate war onsets (red bars), 2) number of societal war onsets (blue bars), and 3) total onsets (orange dashed-line). The number of new war onsets fluctuates between zero and thirteen per year and the number of new societal wars is generally higher than new interstate wars. There is a peak in new societal war onsets that coincides with the end of the Cold War (1990 and 1991), however, the average frequency of societal war onsets does not appear to have changed much across the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War periods. The average rate of onset for societal wars changes slightly: from 3.86 to 3.23 per year. On the other hand, the average rate of onset for interstate wars seems to have fallen by more than half (from 1.43 to 0.64 per year); this brings down the average number of (total) war onsets from 5.26 per year during the Cold War to 3.86 per year in the post-Cold War period.The red-line charts the trend in general level of interstate war in the global system; that measure includes all wars of independence from the Colonial System and has remained fairly constant at a low level through the Cold War period. We can see from the graph that the UN System, that was designed to regulate inter-state war, has been reasonably effective in providing inter-state security. However, the UN System has not been effective in regulating societal (or civil) warfare. The level of societal warfare increased dramatically and continuously through the Cold War period. Separate research indicates that the increasing level of societal war results from the protractedness of societal wars during this period and not from a substantial increase in the numbers of new wars. for a brief description of the methodology used to create the trend graph.A third perspective on the global trend in armed conflict focuses on the annual numbers of onsets of new wars in the global system to examine their frequency and regularity and whether there have been marked changes in those factors over time. Figure 5 charts three additional metrics: 1) number of interstate war onsets (red bars), 2) number of societal war onsets (blue bars), and 3) total onsets (orange dashed-line). The number of new war onsets fluctuates between zero and thirteen per year and the number of new societal wars is generally higher than new interstate wars. There is a peak in new societal war onsets that coincides with the end of the Cold War (1990 and 1991), however, the average frequency of societal war onsets does not appear to have changed much across the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War periods. The average rate of onset for societal wars changes slightly: from 3.86 to 3.23 per year. On the other hand, the average rate of onset for interstate wars seems to have fallen by more than half (from 1.43 to 0.64 per year); this brings down the average number of (total) war onsets from 5.26 per year during the Cold War to 3.86 per year in the post-Cold War period.